Flat vector illustration of an email envelope secured by three DNS verification layers

SPF, DKIM and DMARC are three DNS records that together prove an email really came from your domain. SPF lists which servers may send on your behalf, DKIM attaches a cryptographic signature to each message, and DMARC tells receiving mail servers what to do when those checks fail — and mails you reports about it. Without all three, anyone can put your domain in the From line, and large mailbox providers may filter or reject the mail you actually wanted to send.

Why this matters for your website

Your domain does more than serve a website. It sends order confirmations, password resets, invoices and newsletters. Every one of those messages is a trust signal to a customer.

An unauthenticated domain is a free identity for attackers. They can send "your invoice is overdue" mail that passes basic spam checks because nothing in DNS says it should not. Your customers get phished, and you find out from a support ticket.

There is a commercial cost too. Google and Yahoo both require SPF or DKIM for all senders, and full SPF, DKIM and DMARC alignment for bulk senders, per their published sender guidelines. Fail those and your WooCommerce receipts land in spam.

The three records, in plain English

Each protocol answers a different question. They are complementary, not alternatives.

  • SPF (RFC 7208) — which servers may send for this domain?
  • DKIM (RFC 6376) — was this message signed by the domain, and unchanged in transit?
  • DMARC (RFC 7489) — what should a receiver do when SPF and DKIM do not line up with the visible From address, and where do reports go?
Diagram showing how SPF, DKIM and DMARC are evaluated on an incoming email
DMARC only passes when SPF or DKIM passes and the authenticated domain matches the visible From address.

SPF: the list of allowed senders

example.com. IN TXT "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:sendgrid.net ip4:198.51.100.25 -all"
  • v=spf1 — version tag, must be first.
  • include:_spf.google.com — authorise a provider's published sending hosts.
  • ip4:198.51.100.25 — authorise one fixed IP, for example your own mail server.
  • -all — hard fail everything else. ~all (soft fail) is the safer starting point.

Publish exactly one SPF TXT record at the root of the domain. SPF checks the envelope sender, not the From header a human sees, which is why it cannot stand alone.

DKIM: the cryptographic signature

s1._domainkey.example.com. IN TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqh...IDAQAB"
  • s1 — the selector; each sending service gets its own, so you can run several in parallel.
  • k=rsa — key type. 2048-bit RSA is the common default.
  • p=... — the public key. The private half stays with your mail provider, which signs outgoing messages and adds a DKIM-Signature header.

A receiver fetches the public key from DNS and verifies the signature. Because the signature survives forwarding, DKIM is the more robust of the two authentication methods.

DMARC: policy and reporting

_dmarc.example.com. IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:[email protected]; pct=100; adkim=r; aspf=r"
  • p= — policy for failing mail: none (monitor), quarantine (spam folder) or reject.
  • rua= — where aggregate XML reports are sent. Without it you are blind.
  • pct= — percentage of failing mail the policy applies to, useful for staged rollouts.
  • adkim / aspf — alignment mode, r for relaxed (subdomains allowed) or s for strict.

DMARC only passes if SPF or DKIM passes and the authenticated domain aligns with the From domain. That alignment requirement is what actually stops spoofing.

Five mistakes that quietly break email authentication

  • Two SPF records. A second TXT record starting v=spf1 makes SPF permanently error out. Fix: merge every include: into one record.
  • More than ten DNS lookups. SPF caps mechanism lookups at ten; exceed it and the result is permerror. Fix: drop unused providers or use an SPF flattening service.
  • `p=none` forever. Monitoring mode blocks nothing. Fix: read reports for a few weeks, then move to quarantine, then reject.
  • No DKIM on a third-party sender. Your CRM, invoicing tool or newsletter platform each needs its own selector published. Fix: enable DKIM in every sending tool and add the CNAME or TXT records they give you.
  • No `rua` address. You never learn who is sending as you, or what you broke. Fix: add rua=mailto: pointing to a monitored inbox or a report parser.

What happens with none of them

Three things, in order of how fast you notice them.

  • Spoofing. Anyone can send mail with your domain in the From line, and receivers have no published rule to reject it.
  • Phishing of your own customers. Fake shipping and invoice mail is credible precisely because the domain is real.
  • Deliverability loss. Google's sender guidelines and Yahoo's sender requirements require authentication, with additional DMARC and alignment requirements for bulk senders.
Decision tree for rolling out a DMARC policy from none to reject
A safe DMARC rollout: monitor, fix senders, then tighten the policy in stages.

How to check your own site

Start free and manual. Query DNS yourself:

dig +short TXT example.com
dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com
dig +short TXT s1._domainkey.example.com

If you would rather not read raw DNS, you can check your DMARC record free with our browser tool. It parses SPF syntax, counts lookups and reports your DMARC policy and rua address in seconds.

Scantinel (scantinel.ai) is an automated website security assessment platform that runs OSINT, network, and OWASP Top 10 web vulnerability tests against ownership-verified assets and delivers actionable, business-owner-legible reports. The Essential scan takes minutes, is entirely passive, and includes a DNS records audit and SPF/DKIM/DMARC posture check alongside TLS, security headers, cookie flags and a CMS version and known-vulnerable plugin check. Email posture rarely fails alone, so seeing it next to the rest of your surface is the point; the pricing page lists what each scan covers. For the wider context, read our website security guide.

Key takeaways

  • SPF authorises servers, DKIM signs messages, DMARC decides what happens on failure and reports back.
  • Publish one SPF record, a DKIM selector for every sending service, and a DMARC record with a working rua.
  • p=none is a starting point, not a destination; progress to quarantine, then reject.
  • Google and Yahoo treat authentication as a delivery requirement, not an optional extra.
  • Re-check DNS whenever you add a new mail-sending tool.

Frequently asked questions

Do I need DMARC if I already have SPF?

Yes. SPF validates the envelope sender, which recipients never see, so a spoofer can still forge the visible From address. DMARC adds the alignment check and tells receivers to quarantine or reject when it fails.

What does p=none mean in DMARC?

p=none is monitoring mode: receivers apply no special handling to failing mail but still send you aggregate reports. Use it for a few weeks to find every legitimate sender, then tighten the policy. Left in place indefinitely, it protects nobody.

Can DMARC break my email?

A strict policy can block legitimate mail from a sender you forgot to authorise, such as a helpdesk or invoicing tool. That is why you start at p=none, read the reports, and raise the policy in stages using pct=. Done in that order, the risk is small and reversible.

Published November 2025 by the Scantinel Security Research Team. Standards and vendor requirements change — verify against primary sources such as OWASP, the NVD, WPScan and the RFCs cited above.