Most people think website security starts at the login page. It starts earlier — at your domain name. Before anyone probes your server, they can read your DNS records, pull every certificate you have ever issued from public logs, list subdomains you forgot existed, and check whether your domain can be spoofed in email. None of that requires sending a single request to your site.
This domain security guide is the hub for that whole layer. Each section gives you three things: what goes wrong, how to check it, and how to fix it. Deeper walkthroughs live in the linked articles.
Lock down the registrar account first
If someone controls your registrar login, nothing else on this list matters — they can repoint DNS, reissue certificates and read your mail.
- What goes wrong: shared passwords, no 2FA, an expired domain, or WHOIS contact details that leak a personal email and phone number for social engineering.
- Check: log in and review security settings, auto-renew status, expiry date, and who has access. Look up your domain in a public WHOIS lookup.
- Fix: enable 2FA (app-based, not SMS), turn on registrar lock (
clientTransferProhibited), enable auto-renew, use a role mailbox as the registrant contact, and keep WHOIS privacy on.
DNS hygiene: the records that quietly betray you
Your DNS zone is a public map of your infrastructure. Stale entries in it are one of the most common ways small sites get taken over.
- What goes wrong: dangling CNAME records pointing at deleted cloud resources, wildcard
*records that hand attackers unlimited hostnames, no DNSSEC, no CAA record, and long TTLs that slow down incident response. - Check: export your full zone file and account for every record. Anything you cannot explain is a candidate for deletion.
- Fix: delete unused records, replace wildcards with explicit entries, add a CAA record naming only your real certificate authority, and drop TTLs to 300–3600 seconds before any migration.
Email authentication in one minute
Email authentication is DNS work, which is why it belongs here — three TXT records decide whether strangers can send invoices in your name.
- What goes wrong: no SPF or DKIM, an SPF record with
+allor more than ten lookups, and DMARC left atp=noneforever so nothing is ever enforced. - Check: run your domain through the free SPF/DMARC checker and read the reports it flags.
- Fix: publish SPF, sign with DKIM, then move DMARC to quarantine and reject. Start with SPF, DKIM, and DMARC explained, then set up DMARC step by step.
Subdomains are your forgotten attack surface
Nobody attacks www when staging. is sitting there with last year's WordPress and no password.
- What goes wrong: abandoned staging, demo, legacy shop and marketing-campaign hosts; old admin panels; subdomains delegated to agencies who have since left.
- Check: enumerate subdomains from passive sources and DNS, then open each one and ask who owns it and whether it is still needed.
- Fix: shut down what is dead and delete its DNS record on the same day. For what stays, patch it, put it behind authentication, and keep it in the same update routine as your main site.
What the internet already knows about you
Certificate transparency logs and passive DNS databases are public archives. Attackers use them as a free reconnaissance service, and so should you.
- What goes wrong: every TLS certificate you issue publishes its hostnames permanently, so internal names like
vpn.orerp-test.become public the moment a certificate is issued. - Check: search a CT log viewer for your domain and review every hostname ever certified, including ones you no longer use.
- Fix: avoid descriptive internal names in public certificates, use wildcard certificates for genuinely internal hosts, and treat every name in the logs as something you must be able to defend.
CDN and WAF: don't leak your origin IP
A CDN or WAF only protects you while traffic goes through it. If your real server IP is discoverable, attackers connect directly and bypass every rule you wrote.
- What goes wrong: a leftover
direct.ormail.A record, an MX record on the same host as the website, or historical DNS data from before you moved to a CDN. - Check: resolve every hostname in your zone and see which ones return an address outside your CDN's ranges.
- Fix: proxy all web hostnames, move mail to a separate host, and firewall your origin so it accepts HTTP only from CDN IP ranges.
Your domain security checklist
- Registrar: 2FA on, transfer lock on, auto-renew on, role email as contact, WHOIS privacy on.
- DNS: no dangling CNAMEs, no wildcards, CAA record set, DNSSEC enabled, TTLs sane.
- Email: SPF valid, DKIM signing, DMARC at
p=quarantineor stronger, reports monitored. - Subdomains: full inventory, dead hosts removed, live hosts patched and authenticated.
- Exposure: CT log hostnames reviewed, origin IP not resolvable, CDN/WAF covering every web host.
- TLS: valid certificate on every hostname, HTTPS redirect, HSTS enabled.
Frequently asked questions
What is domain security?
Domain security is the protection of everything attached to your domain name rather than your web application: the registrar account, DNS records, email authentication, TLS certificates and all subdomains. It is the layer an attacker examines first because it is entirely public.
Should I enable DNSSEC?
Yes, if your registrar and DNS provider both support one-click signing — it prevents forged DNS answers. Avoid manual key management if you are not comfortable with it: a broken DNSSEC chain makes your domain unreachable until it is fixed.
What is a CAA record and do I need one?
A CAA record lists the certificate authorities allowed to issue certificates for your domain. It is one DNS line, costs nothing, and stops a rogue or misconfigured CA from issuing a valid certificate in your name. Add it.
Where to start this week
Do the registrar items today — 2FA, lock, auto-renew — because they take ten minutes and block the worst outcome. Then export your DNS zone and delete what you cannot explain. Then move DMARC off p=none.
If you would rather see the whole picture first, Scantinel's Essential scan audits DNS records, email posture, CDN/WAF detection and passively discovered subdomains; the Full scan adds active resolution and origin-IP discovery. Run a domain security assessment, or step back to the complete website security guide for the application layer.
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